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SECTION 230 OF THE COMMUNICATIONS 
DECENCY ACT: WHY CALIFORNIA COURTS 
INTERPRETED IT CORRECTLY AND WHAT 
THAT SAYS ABOUT HOW WE SHOULD 
CHANGE IT 
E. Alex Murcia* 
 In 1996, Congress passed the Communications Decency Act 
(CDA). In 1997, the United States Supreme Court struck down most of 
the CDA. However, section 230, which protects providers and users of 
interactive computer services from liability for defamatory content 
posted to their platforms by third parties, remains in effect. In the 
California and federal judicial systems, courts interpret section 230’s 
immunity provisions broadly—so that the statute conveys broad 
immunity. This Note argues that the broad application of section 230’s 
protections is consistent with the intent of the statute’s drafters. However, 
it also contends that (1) this interpretation of section 230 has had 
unexpected, negative consequences for plaintiffs seeking to recover in 
online defamation cases and (2) that we should consider making changes 
to section 230 that would allow it to accomplish its original purpose 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
As the internet gained popularity in the 1990s, it created a new 
public forum. Unsurprisingly, it also created a new venue for 
defamatory and elicit content online. The spreading of false and 
“unseemly” material online led Congress to pass the Communications 
Decency Act (CDA) as part of the Telecommunications Act of 1996.1 
The CDA included several provisions, now known as “section 230,” 
that immunized providers and users of interactive computer services 
from liability as “publishers” if they participated in the spread of 
defamatory content that they did not create.2 The bill’s sponsors 
reasoned that this protection was necessary to ensure that startups 
operating online had protection from litigious plaintiffs seeking to 
hold them liable for defamatory material that the startups did not have 
the means to monitor or take down.3 
Today, many well-established companies like Facebook, Twitter, 
and Reddit, rely on third-party content to draw in users.4 In addition, 
the explosion of online traffic and commerce in the 2000’s5 led 
politicians to question the necessity of section 230’s defamation-
related protections.6 For instance, in 2020, then President Trump took 
steps to reduce the scope of section 230’s immunity via an executive 
order.7 President Biden proposed doing away with the statute entirely.8 
 
 1. See Robert Cannon, The Legislative History of Senator Exon’s Communications Decency 
Act: Regulating Barbarians on the Information Superhighway, 49 FED. COMMC’NS L.J. 51, 91–92 
(1996) (discussing the passage of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 and the CDA); see also 
Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified in various section 
of 47 U.S.C.). 
 2. See Telecommunications Act of 1996 § 509, 110 Stat. at 138 (codified as amended at 47 
U.S.C. § 230 (2018)) (“No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as 
the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content provider.”). 
 3. See JEFF KOSSEFF, THE TWENTY-SIX WORDS THAT CREATED THE INTERNET 95 (2019). 
 4. See VALERIE C. BRANNON, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R45650, FREE SPEECH AND THE 
REGULATION OF SOCIAL MEDIA CONTENT 1 (2019), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R45650.pdf. 
 5. Max Roser et al., Internet, OUR WORLD IN DATA, https://ourworldindata.org/internet (last 
visited Oct. 4, 2020). 
 6. Berin Szoka, Lindsey Graham’s Sneak Attack on Section 230 and Encryption: A Backdoor 
to a Backdoor?, TECHDIRT (Jan. 31, 2020, 12:05 PM), https://www.techdirt.com/articles/2020013
1/11252343832/lindsey-grahams-sneak-attack-section-230-encryption-backdoor-to-
backdoor.shtml; Makena Kelly, Joe Biden Wants to Revoke Section 230, VERGE (Jan. 17, 2020, 
10:29 AM), https://www.theverge.com/2020/1/17/21070403/joe-biden-president-election-section-
230-communications-decency-act-revoke (discussing Joe Biden’s and Beto O’Rourke’s proposals 
to eliminate section 230). 
 7. See Preventing Online Censorship, 85 Fed. Reg. 34,079, 34,080 (May 28, 2020). 
 8. Kelly, supra note 6. 
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In light of the controversy surrounding section 230, this Note 
focuses on how courts have already defined section 230’s immunity; 
whether that definition is based on a robust interpretation of the law; 
and whether section 230, as codified, adequately serves the interests 
of the public and companies operating in the online space. 
The Note is organized as follows: Part II begins with a brief 
explanation of the historical principles governing defamation law, and 
the changes made to those principles by section 230.9 Part II also 
addresses two significant cases about what class of defendants section 
230 protects.10 Part II also discusses two important California cases 
that dealt with the question of whether section 230’s immunity is 
limited to specific remedies—e.g., damages—or whether it also 
immunizes defendants from injunctive relief.11 
Part III evaluates the interpretations of section 230 adopted by the 
cases discussed in Part II and analyzes interpretations of and proposed 
modifications to section 230.12 Part III contends that there is a definite 
meaning to the provisions of section 230 that pertain to defamation 
and that controlling California case law correctly interprets those 
sections of the statute.13 
Part III also argues that the interpretation of section 230 adopted 
by most courts, although logically sound, produces undesirable 
consequences.14 Most notably, it eliminates virtually all recourse for 
people and businesses defamed online.15 The Note concludes with a 
legislative proposal to amend section 230.16 Instead of proposing 
broad changes to the statute or attacking its purpose, as President 
Biden and former President Trump have done, this proposal 
recommends minor modifications to section 230 to address some of 
its demonstrated shortcomings. 
 
 9. See infra Parts II.A, II.B, II.C. 
 10. See infra Part II.D. 
 11. See infra Part II.E. 
 12. See infra Parts III.A, III.B, III.D. 
 13. See infra Parts III.A, III.B. 
 14. See infra Part III.C. 
 15. See infra Part III.C. 
 16. See infra Part III.E. 
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II.  BACKGROUND 
A.  Common-Law Defamation 
To prevail on a common-law defamation claim in most United 
States courts, a plaintiff must demonstrate that (1) the defendant 
published defamatory material; (2) it concerned the plaintiff; (3) it was 
directed to a third person; (4) the defendant was guilty of fault 
equivalent to negligence or something greater; (5) the publication was 
false; and (6) the plaintiff suffered actual damages.17 
To satisfy the first element, a plaintiff must show that a defendant 
“published” the material.18 Publication means “communication, by 
any method, to one or more persons who can understand the 
meaning.”19 Courts divide up “publishers” of information, i.e., entities 
that make information available to third parties, into two categories: 
publishers and distributors/transmitters.20 
Publishers include anyone from the author of a book to a 
newspaper publishing company.21 The hallmark of the publisher is 
that, with respect to the disputed publication, it “exercise[s] . . . 
traditional editorial functions—such as deciding whether to publish, 
withdraw, postpone or alter content.”22 Notably, liability for 
defamatory content attaches to publishers regardless of whether they 
have notice of the defamatory nature of a publication.23 
A distributor, on the other hand, plays a lesser role in formatting 
and creating a work, but still publishes it.24 Distributors include book 
vendors, public libraries, and newsstands.25 Understandably, courts 
are less willing to impose liability on distributors than publishers.26 
 
 17. DAN B. DOBBS ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS § 519 (2d ed. 2011). Note also that there are 
exceptions to this basic formula, and some plaintiffs are required, by virtue of their status as public 
figures, to meet a higher standard. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 283 (1964) 
(holding that public figures must meet a higher “actual malice” standard to prevail on a defamation 
claim). 
 18. See DOBBS ET AL., supra note 17, § 520. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Sewali K. Patel, Note, Immunizing Internet Service Providers from Third-Party Internet 
Defamation Claims: How Far Should Courts Go?, 55 VAND. L. REV. 647, 651 (2002) (“Under 
traditional defamation law, liability may be imposed upon the creator of a defamatory statement, 
as well as on the disseminator of the defamatory material.”). 
 21. See DOBBS ET AL., supra note 17, § 520. 
 22. Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330 (4th Cir. 1997). 
 23. Barrett v. Rosenthal (Barrett II), 146 P.3d 510, 513 (Cal. 2006). 
 24. See DOBBS ET AL., supra note 17, § 522. 
 25. See id. 
 26. See id. 
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Most courts only find distributors liable for defamation if the 
distributor published defamatory material “with notice of its 
defamatory character.”27  
B.  The Common Law and the Early Internet 
The first suit for defamation against a provider of internet services 
was Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe Inc.28 In Cubby, the plaintiff brought 
suit against CompuServe in the Southern District of New York.29 The 
plaintiff alleged that Rumorville USA, which produced posts about the 
journalism industry and made them available on a forum hosted by 
CompuServe, had published defamatory statements about the 
plaintiff.30 The plaintiff also alleged that CompuServe was liable as a 
publisher of the content developed by Rumorville USA because it 
made Rumorville USA available to its subscribers and thus 
“published” the material.31 The district court rejected Cubby’s libel 
claim and ruled in favor of CompuServe.32 The court found that 
CompuServe exercised “no more editorial control over such a 
publication than does a public library, book store, or newsstand, and it 
would be no more feasible for CompuServe to examine every 
publication it carries for potentially defamatory statements than it 
would be for any other distributor to do so.”33 Accordingly, it held that 
CompuServe was not a publisher but a distributor of Rumorville 
USA’s content.34 As a distributor, CompuServe was not liable for 
Rumorville USA’s defamatory publication because it did not have 
notice of its defamatory content.35 
In the next case addressing a similar question, Stratton Oakmont, 
Inc. v. Prodigy Services Co.,36 the facts largely matched those in 
Cubby. At the time of the suit, Prodigy Services was an online 
company that allowed subscribers to exchange messages on its 
 
 27. Barrett II, 146 P.3d at 513. 
 28. 776 F. Supp. 135 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). 
 29. KOSSEFF, supra note 3, at 38–39. 
 30. Cubby, Inc., 776 F. Supp. at 137–38. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. at 142. 
 33. Id. at 140. 
 34. See id. 
 35. See id. at 141. 
 36. No. 31063/94, 1995 WL 323710 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995), superseded by statute, 
Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 509, 110 Stat. 56, 138 (codified as 
amended 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2018)). 
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bulletin boards.37 Before the suit, a series of posts supplied by an 
anonymous user appeared on one of Prodigy’s bulletin boards.38 The 
posts accused Stratton Oakmont of wrongdoing in connection with a 
financial transaction.39 Stratton Oakmont disputed the legitimacy of 
the posts and filed a lawsuit against Prodigy.40 Prodigy relied on 
Cubby in its defense.41 
The court distinguished Prodigy’s role in the publication process 
from that of CompuServes’ in Cubby. The court concluded that 
Prodigy “held itself out” as having more “control[] [over] the content 
of its computer bulletin boards” than CompuServe.42 Therefore, unlike 
CompuServe, Prodigy could be held liable as a publisher of content.43 
Notably, the court made a concerted effort to point out that it 
agreed with the Cubby opinion and that this scenario differed because 
Prodigy, unlike CompuServe, promoted itself as a family-friendly 
platform that actively moderated content.44 However, commentators 
took a different message from Stratton Oakmont; that being, platforms 
that moderated content in good faith might be liable for any 
defamatory material on their bulletins.45 This holding worried 
commentators.46 One concern was that Stratton Oakmont might force 
some providers of internet services to police content too strictly to 
ensure that they are not held liable for defamatory material made 
 
 37. Id. at *1. 
 38. David P. Miranda, Defamation in Cyberspace: Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Services 
Co., 5 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 229, 233–35, 235 n.39 (1996) (addressing the fact that the posts were 
anonymous, so Stratton Oakmont could not sue the immediate poster and instead had to sue 
Prodigy). 
 39. Stratton Oakmont, 1995 WL 323710, at *1. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. at *4. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. at *5 (“Let it be clear that this court is in full agreement with Cubby . . . . Computer 
bulletin boards should generally be regarded in the same context as bookstores, libraries and 
network affiliates.”); see Peter H. Lewis, Personal Computers; The CompuServe Edge: Delicate 
Data Balance, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 29, 1994), https://www.nytimes.com/1994/11/29/science/person
al-computers-the-compuserve-edge-delicate-data-balance.html; see also Robert D. Shapiro, This Is 
Not Your Father’s Prodigy, WIRED (June 1, 1993, 12:00 PM), https://www.wired.com/1993/06/pr
odigy/ (indicating that Prodigy did pull down content on the grounds that it was inappropriate). 
 45. See R. Hayes Johnson, Jr., Case Note, Defamation in Cyberspace: A Court Takes a Wrong 
Turn on the Information Superhighway in Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Services Co., 49 ARK. 
L. REV. 589, 623 (1996). 
 46. David S. Ardia, Free Speech Savior or Shield for Scoundrels: An Empirical Study of 
Intermediary Immunity Under Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, 43 LOY. L.A. L. 
REV. 373, 409 (2010) (noting that the Stratton Oakmont decision created “quite an uproar” among 
commentators). 
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accessible by their services.47 However, others feared that the opposite 
would result, i.e., that providers would stop monitoring content 
entirely in order to hide behind distributor protections.48 
It was mainly because of these concerns that Congress put an end 
to the common law of defamation, with respect to online content, just 
a few months later.49 
C.  The Communications Decency Act 
The CDA was not initially proposed to protect providers of 
internet services from liability for defamatory content. Instead, the bill 
began as an effort to protect minors from encountering pornography 
online.50 In fact, Senator James Exon initially proposed the CDA to 
regulate pornography on the internet.51 
Exon’s proposal sought to effect penalties on providers of internet 
services that exposed minors to pornography.52 Exon’s bill, which 
posed a risk of censoring other speech, sparked concern among free 
speech advocates and civil liberties groups.53 
 
 47. See KOSSEFF, supra note 3, at 272 (discussing how the elimination of protections for 
intermediaries online might result in mass censorship); see also discussion infra note 237. 
 48. See James P. Jenal, When Is a User Not a “User”? Finding the Proper Role for 
Republication Liability on the Internet, 24 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 453, 459 (2004); see also Peter 
H. Lewis, After Apology from Prodigy, Firm Drops Suit, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 25, 1995), 
https://www.nytimes.com/1995/10/25/business/after-apology-from-prodigy-firm-drops-suit.html 
(stating that the Stratton Oakmont case could result in online service providers either having to 
moderate all content to protect themselves from liability or decline moderating anything in order 
to fit within the protections provided by the Cubby decision); Johnson, supra note 45, at 594 n.10, 
623. 
 49. Andrew P. Bolson, Flawed but Fixable: Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act 
at 20, 42 RUTGERS COMPUT. & TECH. L.J. 1, 5–8 (2016) (explaining that Congress was motivated 
to pass section 230, in part, by Stratton Oakmont and the concern that Stratton Oakmont would 
place a heavy burden on companies operating in the internet space). 
 50. KOSSEFF, supra note 3, at 62–63. 
 51. 141 CONG. REC. 3203 (1995). Exon became concerned about this matter around the time 
that an undergraduate at Carnegie Mellon University, Marty Rimm, published an article alleging 
that over 80 percent of images on the internet were pornography. Rimm’s article was published in 
the Georgetown Law Review. See Lynne Christensen, Cyberporn Study: More Heat Than Light?, 
21STC, http://www.columbia.edu/cu/21stC/issue-1.2/Cyber.htm (last visited Oct. 4, 2020); see also 
Cannon, supra note 1, at 53–54. Rimm’s article was major news at the time: it appeared on the 
front page of Time magazine, and was referenced on the Senate floor by Senator Grassley. Cannon, 
supra note 1, at 54. However, the article has since been discredited. Id. at 55. For more on the Rimm 
article, see Marty Rimm, Marketing Pornography on the Information Superhighway: A Survey of 
917,410 Images, Descriptions, Short Stories, and Animations Downloaded 8.5 Million Times by 
Consumers in Over 2000 Cities in Forty Countries, Provinces, and Territories, 83 GEO. L.J. 1849 
(1995). 
 52. KOSSEFF, supra note 3, at 62. 
 53. Id. at 63–64. 
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While Exon’s proposal attracted heat from public interest groups, 
representatives Christopher Cox and Ron Wyden worked on a 
different bill that also sought to protect minors from indecent content 
online. This bill employed a more “hands-off” approach to ensuring 
that online platforms regulated content.54 Instead of punishing 
providers for incidentally providing users with access to false or 
inappropriate content, the bill protected providers of internet services 
from treatment as “publishers” of content, defamatory or otherwise, 
even if they, like Prodigy, moderated content.55 This protection was 
designed to prevent the two scenarios that critics of Stratton Oakmont 
feared it might produce: over and underpolicing of online content.56 
This new immunity ensured that companies already taking steps to 
monitor content on their platforms would not be penalized with 
publisher liability, as was the case under Stratton Oakmont.57 
The relevant portions of the Cox-Wyden bill, later codified as 47 
U.S.C. § 230, state the following: 
(c) Protection for “Good Samaritan” blocking and 
screening of offensive material 
(1) Treatment of publisher or speaker[:] No provider or 
user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as 
the publisher or speaker of any information provided by 
another information content provider. 
(2) Civil liability[:] No provider or user of an interactive 
computer service shall be held liable on account of— 
(A) any action voluntarily taken in good faith to 
restrict access to or availability of material that the 
provider or user considers to be obscene, lewd, 
lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or 
otherwise objectionable, whether or not such material 
is constitutionally protected; or 
 
 54. Id. at 63. 
 55. 141 CONG. REC. 22045 (1995) (statement of Rep. Cox) (“Mr. Chairman, our amendment 
will do two basic things: First, it will protect computer Good Samaritans, online service providers, 
anyone who provides a front end to the Internet, let us say, who takes steps to screen indecency and 
offensive material for their customers. It will protect them from taking on liability such as occurred 
in the Prodigy case in New York that they should not face for helping us and for helping us solve 
this problem.”). 
 56. Id. (statement of Rep. Cox) (indicating his bill intended to overrule the absurd 
consequences of Stratton Oakmont). 
 57. Id. 
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(B) any action taken to enable or make available to 
information content providers or others the technical 
means to restrict access to material described in 
paragraph (1). . . . 
(e) Effect on other laws . . . . 
(3) State law[:] Nothing in this section shall be construed 
to prevent any State from enforcing any State law that is 
consistent with this section. No cause of action may be 
brought and no liability may be imposed under any State 
or local law that is inconsistent with this section.58 
For the purposes of defamation law, section 230 can be distilled 
to these three provisions: (c)(1), (c)(2), and (e)(3).59 The first 
provision, subsection (c)(1), provides immunity for providers or users 
of an interactive computer service (typically websites or website 
users) from treatment as publishers of defamatory content provided by 
information content providers (often persons) on platforms hosted by 
the interactive computer service.60 
The second significant provision, subsection (c)(2), prevents civil 
liability from attaching to providers or users of interactive computer 
services regardless of what steps the user or provider takes to eliminate 
third-party content on its platform.61 This section ensures that no 
matter what a provider or user of an interactive computer service does 
to moderate content provided by third parties, it cannot be held liable 
if it unfairly restricts access to that content.62 This is distinct from 
(c)(1) in that it protects against only civil liability and applies only if 
a lawsuit seeks to hold providers and users of interactive computer 
services liable for the removal of content.63 
The third provision of importance, subsection (e)(3), provides 
that section 230 does not bar states from enforcing their own 
defamation law so long as the state law is consistent with section 
 
 58. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c), (e)(3) (2018). 
 59. See id. 
 60. See id. § 230(c)(1). 
 61. See id. § 230(c)(2). 
 62. See id. The plain text of subsection (c)(2) strongly supports this explanation of the statute. 
However, this interpretation is also bolstered by statements made by former U.S. Representative 
from California Christopher Cox in the Congressional Record where he indicated that his proposal 
was designed to protect persons taking steps to censor inappropriate or otherwise objectionable 
content. 141 CONG. REC. 22045 (1995) (statement of Rep. Cox). 
 63. See discussion supra Part II.C. 
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230.64 Defamation is typically a state law cause of action, so this 
provision ensures that section 230 provides immunity from state law 
claims where state law provides a remedy not permitted by section 
230.65 
D.  Interpreting Section 230: The Class Protected 
After section 230 passed, the question of who qualified for the 
immunity provided by the statute immediately became crucial. The 
first case concerning this question was Zeran v. America Online, Inc.66 
The controversy in Zeran arose when Seattle resident Ken Zeran 
began receiving threatening phone calls from angry America Online, 
Inc. (“AOL”) subscribers.67 The callers claimed that Zeran had posted 
an advertisement on an AOL forum in which he offered for sale 
offensive t-shirts that ridiculed the bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah 
Federal Building in Oklahoma.68 However, Zeran did not post the 
advertisements; instead, the user who posted the advertisement, listed 
Zeran’s phone number as the number to call to obtain one of the 
shirts.69 Zeran asked AOL to remove the advertisements.70 It did not.71 
After experiencing months of additional threats from AOL users,72 
Zeran filed a suit against AOL in federal court.73 
Zeran alleged that because he made AOL aware of these 
defamatory posts, AOL acted negligently when it failed to remove 
them.74 AOL raised section 230 as a defense.75 Zeran argued that the 
statute’s bar against treating providers of interactive computer services 
as “publishers,” under subsection (c)(1), did not block suits against 
 
 64. See discussion infra Part II.E. 
 65. See Matthew G. Jeweler, Essay, The Communications Decency Act of 1996: Why § 230 Is 
Outdated and Publisher Liability for Defamation Should Be Reinstated Against Internet Service 
Providers, 8 PITT. J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 1, 9 (2008). 
 66. 958 F. Supp. 1124 (E.D. Va. 1997), aff’d, 129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997); David 
Lukmire, Note, Can the Courts Tame the Communications Decency Act?: The Reverberations of 
Zeran v. America Online, 66 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 371, 385 (2010) (describing Zeran as the 
first major case interpreting section 230). 
 67. See Zeran, 958 F. Supp. at 1126. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. at 1127. 
 71. See KOSSEFF, supra note 3, at 81–83 (discussing Zeran’s communications with AOL in 
which he requested that it remove the posts). 
 72. Zeran, 958 F. Supp. at 1128. 
 73. KOSSEFF, supra note 3, at 83. 
 74. Zeran, 958 F. Supp. at 1128. 
 75. Id. at 1126. 
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providers of interactive computer services as “distributors” of 
defamatory content, and therefore he could proceed with his suit.76 
The district judge agreed with AOL.77 Zeran appealed, but the Fourth 
Circuit affirmed.78 The Fourth Circuit held that the term “publisher” 
historically encompassed distributors and publishers, so AOL was 
protected from suit by section 230.79 
The Zeran ruling, although called into question by 
commentators,80 is a seminal case in the history of section 230 
jurisprudence as many federal and state courts follow its broad reading 
of subsection (c)(1).81 
The California Supreme Court adopted the Zeran court’s 
reasoning and holding in Barrett v. Rosenthal.82 The Barrett decision 
is particularly significant with respect to section 230 because unlike in 
Zeran, where the Fourth Circuit affirmed the lower court’s judgment, 
the California Supreme Court overturned a lower court ruling.83 This 
gave the supreme court an opportunity to knock down some of the 
counterarguments to the Zeran court’s expansive view of the statute. 
In Barrett, two physicians sued defendant Rosenthal for sharing 
allegedly libelous messages on a website that promoted alternative 
medicine.84 The defamation claims centered around several email 
messages that Rosenthal received from another party and then 
reposted.85 The messages made various false accusations, including 
that one of the plaintiffs stalked a Canadian radio personality.86 
Departing from Zeran, the California Court of Appeal declined to 
immunize Rosenthal and found that section 230 did not protect against 
 
 76. Id. at 1133. 
 77. Id. at 1137. 
 78. Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 335 (4th Cir. 1997). 
 79. Id. at 332, 334. 
 80. See David R. Sheridan, Zeran v. AOL and the Effect of Section 230 of the Communications 
Decency Act Upon Liability for Defamation on the Internet, 61 ALB. L. REV. 147, 162 (1997) 
(arguing that section 230(c)(1) may not in fact protect distributors). 
 81. Ian C. Ballon, ‘Zeran v. AOL’ and Its Inconsistent Legacy, RECORDER (Nov. 10, 2017, 
12:45 AM), https://www.law.com/therecorder/sites/therecorder/2017/11/10/2017ballon-essay/ 
(noting that “[m]ost circuits construe the CDA broadly, consistent with Zeran”). 
 82. 146 P.3d 510 (Cal. 2006). 
 83. See Barrett v. Rosenthal (Barrett I), 9 Cal. Rptr. 3d 142, 167 (Ct. App. 2004), rev’d, 146 
P.3d 510 (Cal. 2006). 
 84. Id. at 144. 
 85. Ilena Rosenthal’s Respondent’s Brief at 7–8, Barrett I, 9 Cal. Rptr. 3d 142 (Ct. App. 2004) 
(No. A096451). 
 86. Barrett I, 9 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 149–50. 
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distributor liability.87 In addition, it criticized the reasoning in Zeran 
and noted that even though distributor liability is sometimes 
considered a subset of publisher liability, the common law treated 
distributors and publishers differently, and liability attached under 
different circumstances.88 The court then concluded that the “word 
‘publisher’ [in subsection (c)(1) of the statute was] . . . too flimsy a 
basis upon which to grant . . . ‘absolute protection’ . . . . [as it was] at 
least capable of two reasonable constructions.”89 
Lastly, the court stated that the Zeran interpretation of subsection 
(c)(1), which interpreted subsection (c)(1) to protect distributors, 
rendered subsection (c)(2) meaningless.90 It reasoned that if absolute 
immunity were granted by (c)(1), then (c)(2), which protects entities 
that take good-faith steps to eliminate objectionable content online, 
would be duplicative.91 
The California Supreme Court reversed.92 Unlike the court of 
appeal, it found that the term “publisher” was not too ambiguous to 
justify subsection (c)(1)’s application to traditional publishers and 
distributors.93 Distributors, it noted, are often classified as secondary 
publishers, and Congress was aware of this when it passed the 
statute.94 The court also rejected the contention that broadly construing 
subsection (c)(1) of the statute negated the purpose of subsection 
(c)(2).95 Instead, it determined, correctly, that subsection (c)(2), which 
states that “no provider . . . shall be held liable [for] any action . . . to 
restrict access . . . or make available . . . technical means to restrict 
access,”96 protected providers of interactive computer services from 
liability stemming from censorship, not publication, of material.97 
The supreme court’s decision in Barrett brought California in line 
with most jurisdictions that had addressed the question of whether 
 
 87. Id. at 152; Jae Hong Lee, Note, Batzel v. Smith & Barrett v. Rosenthal: Defamation 
Liability for Third-Party Content on the Internet, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 469, 477 (2004). 
 88. Barrett I, 9 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 156. 
 89. Id. at 157. 
 90. Id. at 158. 
 91. Id.; Gregory M. Dickinson, Note, An Interpretive Framework for Narrower Immunity 
Under Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, 33 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 863, 869–
70 (2010). 
 92. Barrett II, 146 P.3d 510, 529 (Cal. 2006). 
 93. Id. at 519. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. 
 96. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2) (2018). 
 97. Barrett II, 146 P.3d at 520. 
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section 230(c)(1) protected both distributors and publishers.98 But, the 
points made by the court of appeal also exposed some ambiguities in 
the statute. 
E.  Interpreting Section 230: The Extent of Protection 
The next major interpretative question concerning section 230 
jurisprudence was the scope of the immunization provided by the 
statute. The courts discussed above agreed that section 230 protects 
providers and users of interactive computer services from claims 
under which damages are sought.99 But, other courts have disagreed 
about whether it also provides immunity from injunctive relief.100 In 
Kathleen R. v. City of Livermore,101 the California Court of Appeal 
determined that it did.102 
In Kathleen R., the plaintiff brought suit against the City of 
Livermore after her underage son obtained pornography through the 
city library’s internet.103 She alleged that the City, which made the 
internet available on its computers and did not bar access to sexually 
explicit content, could be held liable to her under various state and 
federal laws.104 She requested an injunction against the city that would 
require it to cease offering unrestricted access to the internet on its 
computers.105 
In dismissing the plaintiff’s claims, the court of appeal first 
reasoned that the library was not the creator of pornographic content 
and that the library qualified as a provider of interactive computer 
services because it made the internet connection available.106 This 
meant it had immunity under the Zeran and Barrett interpretation of 
subsection (c)(1) of section 230.107 
The next question the court addressed was whether the immunity 
that applied to the city under section 230 was broad enough to protect 
 
 98. See Ballon, supra note 81 (“[m]ost circuits construe the CDA broadly, consistent with 
Zeran.”). 
 99. See discussion supra Part II.D. 
 100. See discussion infra Parts II.E, II.F. 
 101. 104 Cal. Rptr. 2d 772 (Ct. App. 2001). 
 102. Id. at 781. 
 103. Id. at 775. 
 104. Id. (discussing plaintiff’s state law claims and her cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983). 
 105. Id. at 776. 
 106. Id. at 777. 
 107. Id. at 780–81. 
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it from injunctive relief.108 The court found that it was.109 In support 
of its finding that the city was immune, the court cited subsection 
(e)(3) of the statute.110 Subsection (e)(3) states that “[n]o cause of 
action may be brought and no liability may be imposed under any State 
or local law that is inconsistent with this section.”111 To the court, this 
meant that if the city was immunized from an injunction, that 
immunity had to stem from either the phrase “no cause of action” or 
the phrase “no liability may be imposed.”112 In looking at these 
phrases, the court found that the word “liability” could arguably be 
interpreted to refer only to damages.113 This meant that it might not 
provide immunity from an injunction. However, it also concluded that 
even if liability “mean[t] only [immunity from] an award of 
damages . . . the statute by its terms also preclude[d] other causes of 
action for other forms of relief.”114 
The Kathleen R. decision answered the question of whether 
section 230 protected defendants from injunctions when the 
injunctions were sought under a cause of action brought under state 
law directly against an immunized defendant. However, the result in 
Kathleen R. also left one question open: Were defendant providers and 
users of interactive computer services immunized from injunctions 
obtained against them in suits brought by defamed plaintiffs against 
third party information content providers? In other words, did section 
230 protect a provider or user of an interactive computer service from 
an injunction ordering it to take down defamatory content when the 
injunction was obtained in a lawsuit against a third-party information 
content provider? In Hassell v. Bird,115 the California Supreme Court 
offered its answer.116 
The controversy in Hassell stemmed from a brief period of time 
when the Hassell Law Group (“Hassell”) represented Ava Bird in the 
 
 108. Id. at 781. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. 
 111. 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(3) (2018). 
 112. Kathleen R., 104 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 781. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. (emphasis added). As additional support for this interpretation, the court looked to 
several non-California courts that declined to permit injunctive relief against a provider of 
interactive computer services under section 230. Id. (citing Ben Ezra, Weinstein, & Co. v. Am. 
Online Inc., 206 F.3d 980, 983–84 (10th Cir. 2000)). 
 115. 420 P.3d 776 (Cal. 2018). 
 116. See id. 
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summer of 2012.117 Bird contacted and retained Hassell to assist her 
on a personal injury claim.118 But, after just twenty-five days of 
representation, the firm withdrew.119 It cited difficulties 
communicating with Bird as the basis.120 
Several months later in January 2013,121 someone posted a Yelp 
review criticizing Hassell and its legal work on behalf of the poster.122 
The poster went by the username “Birdzeye B.”123 The review accused 
the firm of “mak[ing] a bad situation much worse,” improperly 
reneging on a legal obligation, and failing to communicate with an 
insurance company regarding the poster’s claim.124 The post also 
advised readers not to hire Hassell.125 After seeing the review, and 
under the suspicion that Bird had posted it, Hassell contacted Bird via 
email.126 Bird was asked to remove the review.127 Bird refused.128 
After this exchange, Hassell filed a suit against Bird.129 In the suit, 
Hassell alleged that Bird’s review was defamatory.130 The firm sought 
an injunction ordering Bird to take down the review.131 More 
 
 117. Hassell v. Bird (Hassell I), 203 Cal. Rptr. 3d 203, 208–09 (Ct. App. 2016), rev’d, 420 P.3d 
776 (Cal. 2018). 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. 
 120. See Plaintiff’s Summary of the Case in Support of Default Judgment and Request for 
Injunctive Relief at 1, Hassell I, 203 Cal. Rptr. 3d 203 (Ct. App. 2016) (No. CGC13-530525) 
[hereinafter Plaintiff’s Summary of the Case]. 
 121. Hassell I, 203 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 208. 
 122. Birdzeye B., Comment to Hassell Law Group, YELP (Jan. 28, 2013), 
https://www.yelp.com/biz/hassell-law-group-san-francisco-2?start=20 [hereinafter Bird’s Original 
Yelp Review]. 
 123. Id. The court of appeal and supreme court sometimes refer to the relevant Yelp username 
as “Birdseye B.” However, the correct username is “Birdzeye B.” 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Hassell I, 203 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 209. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. Note also that Bird admitted, contrary to her post on Yelp, that Hassell had contacted 
her insurance company about her claim. This made Hassell’s defamation cause of action 
particularly strong because Bird essentially conceded that she lied in her post on Yelp. Compare 
Plaintiff’s Summary of the Case, supra note 120, at 1 (indicating that Bird admitted in an email 
that Hassell had contacted her insurance company), with Bird’s Original Yelp Review, supra note 
122 (indicating that Hassell failed to contact Bird’s insurer). 
 129. Hassell I, 203 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 210. 
 130. Id. at 209. 
 131. Id. Shortly after Hassell served Bird with notice of the suit, another Yelp review appeared 
under the Birdzeye B. username. This review claimed, among other things, that Hassell had filed a 
lawsuit against the reviewer for the initial review and was now trying to “threaten, bully, intimidate, 
[and] harass [her] into removing the [original] review!” See Birdzeye B., Comment to Hassell Law 
Group, YELP (Apr. 29, 2013), https://www.yelp.com/biz/hassell-law-group-san-francisco-
2?start=20. Moreover, plaintiff also believed, but was never able to prove, that Bird created another 
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significantly though, it also requested an order demanding that Yelp 
remove the review if Bird refused.132 
Bird did not answer Hassell’s complaint and Hassell petitioned 
the trial court for entry of a default judgment against Bird.133 The trial 
court, after a hearing on the merits of Hassell’s claim, found the 
reviews defamatory and entered a judgment for Hassell.134 The 
corresponding order instructed Bird to remove the reviews.135 The 
court also ordered Yelp to remove the reviews if Bird failed do so.136 
Bird did not remove the reviews,137 so Hassell served Yelp with the 
trial court’s order.138 Yelp appealed.139 
In its appellate briefs, Yelp argued that it was immune from the 
injunction because of section 230.140 The court of appeal rejected these 
contentions.141 It concluded that Yelp was not immune under section 
230 because (1) an injunction obtained against Yelp in a proceeding 
in which Yelp was not a party was not an imposition of “liability” 
within the meaning of section 230, and (2) no cause of action had been 
alleged directly against Yelp.142 
After the court of appeal ruled against Yelp, Yelp petitioned the 
California Supreme Court to review the case; the court granted Yelp’s 
petition.143 In reversing the court of appeal, the California Supreme 
Court declined to enforce the injunction against Yelp.144 
In its briefs filed with the California Supreme Court, Hassell 
reused the argument that subsection (e)(3), which bars plaintiffs from 
 
Yelp account under the username “J.D.” Hassell I, 203 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 209–10. Bird later denied 
that she had posted anything under that username. Hassell v. Bird (Hassell III), 420 P.3d 776, 781, 
n.5 (Cal. 2018); Application for Leave to File Amicus Curiae Brief; Amicus Curiae Brief of Ava 
Bird, Defendant, in Support of Appellant Yelp, Inc. at 3, Hassell III, 420 P.3d 776 (Cal. 2018) (No. 
S235968). 
 132. Plaintiff’s Summary of the Case, supra note 120, at 22. 
 133. Hassell I, 203 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 210. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. at 210–11. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. at 211–12. 
 138. Id. at 211. 
 139. Id. at 212–13. Yelp refused to comply with the order and instead filed a motion to set aside 
and vacate the trial court’s judgment on the grounds that the ruling was not in line with the 
applicable facts or law. The presiding superior court judge declined to reverse the defamation 
finding and upheld the injunction. Yelp then appealed. 
 140. Id. at 224–27 (discussing Yelp’s claim of immunity under section 230 and dismissing it). 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Hassell v. Bird (Hassell II), 381 P.3d 231 (Cal. 2016). 
 144. Hassell III, 420 P.3d 776, 779 (Cal. 2018). 
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bringing state law causes of action inconsistent with section 230, did 
not apply under the circumstances because Hassell had not alleged any 
cause of action against Yelp.145 However, the court rejected this 
contention and noted that section 230 did not actually state that a 
“cause of action always must be alleged directly against [a provider or 
user of an interactive computer service]” in order for immunity to 
apply.146 
The plurality opinion of the California Supreme Court also 
rejected the argument adopted by the court of appeal that the 
injunction did not subject Yelp to “liability.”147 Unlike the court of 
appeal, it concluded that historical use of the term “liability” was 
“broad” enough to encompass an injunction.148 
After refusing to uphold the injunction, the plurality closed its 
opinion by expressing sympathy for Hassell’s predicament.149 
However, it also insisted, rather paradoxically, that Hassell still had 
“powerful . . . remedies available.”150 The court declined to specify 
how those remedies could provide any relief under the 
circumstances.151 
Given the difficulty of the question presented to the court, the case 
also resulted in several concurring and dissenting opinions.152 Justice 
Kruger concurred with the plurality but contended that the injunction 
could not stand because it violated the principle that injunctions do not 
 
 145. Respondents’ Answer to Yelp’s Petition for Review at 18, Hassell III, 420 P.3d 776 (Cal. 
2018) (No. S235968). 
 146. Hassell III, 420 P.3d at 791. The plurality also concluded that Hassell’s briefs 
fundamentally understated the scope of section 230’s protection. Id. at 791. The court noted that 
Congress’s chief intent in passing section 230 was to provide providers and users of interactive 
computer services with broad immunity from suit in order to protect them from “the burdens 
associated with defending against . . . claims . . . and from compelled compliance with [orders 
that] . . . assign[ed] them the . . . responsibilities of . . . publisher[s] . . . .” Id. This injunction, the 
plurality claimed, implicated Congress’s concerns about overburdening these providers because 
injunctive relief could be “at least as burdensome to the service provider as damages,” id. (quoting 
Noah v. AOL Time Warner Inc., 261 F. Supp. 2d 532, 540 (E.D. Va. 2003)), and might “generate 
substantial litigation over matters such as . . . validity or scope, or the manner in which it [was] 
implemented.” Id. The plurality also noted that Hassell could not be allowed to prevail because its 
lawsuit against Bird was essentially an attempt to subvert the purpose of section 230. Id. In other 
words, suing Bird allowed Hassell to obtain an order against Yelp that it could not have obtained 
by suing Yelp directly. Id. at 788. 
 147. Id. at 790–91. 
 148. Id. at 791. 
 149. Id. at 793. 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. at 794–825. 
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bind nonparties.153 Her decision did not turn on the section 230 
analysis but on a more fundamental principle—due process.154 
Justice Liu, in a dissent, argued that the plurality’s opinion 
improperly expanded section 230.155 First, he contended, Zeran and 
Barrett were inapplicable because they involved suits directly against 
the interactive computer service provider; this case did not.156 Second, 
he found that Congress’s concern that providers of interactive 
computer services would be subject to the burdens of litigation 
concerning defamatory material did not apply to this case because the 
injunction did not impose a significant burden on Yelp.157 Third, he 
contended that requiring Yelp to comply with the injunction did not 
amount to treating Yelp as a publisher under section 230 because the 
injunction was not concerned with an editorial decision by Yelp.158 
Justice Cuéllar also penned a dissent.159 Justice Cuéllar first 
focused on the issue of Yelp’s liability and whether Yelp was in fact 
held “liable” under section 230 by the injunction.160 He contended that 
section 230(e)(3) was not even implicated by the injunction because 
liability was a narrow term that included only “financial or legal 
obligation[s], such as a duty of care under tort law, the breach of which 
gives rise to a tort lawsuit—that treats a service provider or user as the 
publisher . . . of third party content.”161 In support of this, he noted that 
Congress wrote section 230 with the concern that “tort-based” 
lawsuits would create “tort liability” for interactive computer service 
providers and users.162 He claimed that this “support[ed] [his] 
definition of liability [only] as a financial obligation, like damages.”163 
Lastly, Justice Cuéllar addressed several dangers and 
inconsistencies he believed stemmed from the plurality opinion.164 
Most importantly, he pointed out that the plurality’s opinion 
effectively terminated any remedies for defamation victims where the 
 
 153. Id. at 794 (Kruger, J., concurring). 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. at 802 (Liu, J., dissenting). 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. at 802–03. 
 158. Id. at 806. 
 159. Id. (Cuéllar, J., dissenting). 
 160. Id. at 810. 
 161. Id. at 811. 
 162. Id. (quoting Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330 (4th Cir. 1997)). 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. at 816–24. 
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content provider was unavailable “like in circumstances of absentia or 
death.”165 Justice Cuéllar found this problem particularly difficult to 
reconcile with section 230, given that one of Congress’s aims in 
drafting the statute was to reduce objectionable content online.166 
F.  The Lay of the Land 
The case law discussed in sections A and B of Part II explains 
what entities are immunized by section 230 and to what extent those 
entities are immunized. 
As discussed in section A, section 230 provides immunity from 
defamatory content online to providers and users of interactive 
computer services. Under the Zeran and Barrett decisions, this 
protection applies regardless of whether the provider or user of 
interactive computer services qualifies as a publisher or distributor.167 
As addressed in section B, courts also interpret the statute to 
protect the providers and users of interactive computer services, i.e., 
the class protected by the statute, from claims for damages and 
injunctions when the damages and injunctions are sought directly 
against providers and users of interactive computer services.168 In 
addition, under Hassell, providers and users of interactive computer 
services are protected from injunctions that are obtained in 
proceedings against third-party information content providers.169 
III.  DISCUSSION 
A.  Courts Correctly Interpreted Section 230 by Applying Its 
Immunity to Publishers and Distributors 
The first question that must be answered before proposing 
changes to section 230 is what its current text means, and whether 
courts have interpreted it correctly. With respect to section 230 as it 
has been interpreted in California, an analysis of this question begins 
 
 165. Id. at 819. 
 166. See id. at 819–20. Justice Cuéllar also addressed the question of whether the Due Process 
Clause granted the trial court authority to issue the injunction against Yelp under these 
circumstances had section 230 not been not on the books. He concluded that the answer to this 
question was not clear and that the case should be remanded to the trial court to determine whether 
it was permissible to subject Yelp to the injunction. Id. at 824. 
 167. See infra Part III.A. 
 168. See infra Part III.B. 
 169. See Hassell III, 420 P.3d at 779 (declining to uphold the injunction against Yelp on the 
grounds that section 230 immunized Yelp from injunctive relief). 
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with inquiries into the legislative history of the statute and the case 
law that has determined who is protected by it.170 
The question presented in Zeran and Barrett was whether section 
230 protected distributors from treatment as distributors, for the 
purposes of defamation liability, even though the word “distributor” 
does not appear in the statute. The Zeran and Barrett courts found that 
section 230 protects distributors.171 However, the court of appeal in 
Barrett adopted a different view. In addition, a number of academic 
commentators criticized Zeran and argued that it reached the wrong 
conclusion.172 One scholar contended that the legislative history and 
text of section 230 show that the statute should be read narrowly—as 
not protecting distributors.173 Another scholar argued that when 
Congress wrote section 230, it deliberately excluded the word 
distributor.174 The scholar contended that this fact shows that the 
statute’s protections only apply to true publishers of content.175 If 
these commentators are correct, then courts misconstrued section 230 
and used it to immunize too large of a class of providers and users of 
interactive computer services.176 
There are compelling reasons to believe that the Zeran and 
Barrett courts correctly interpreted section 230. For instance, the 
 
 170. Emily K. Fritts, Note, Internet Libel and the Communications Decency Act: How the 
Courts Erroneously Interpreted Congressional Intent with Regard to Liability of Internet Service 
Providers, 93 KY. L.J. 765, 775 (2004–2005) (stating that Zeran was the first case to interpret 
section 230). 
 171. Mark D. Quist, Comment, “Plumbing the Depths” of the CDA: Weighing the Competing 
Fourth and Seventh Circuit Standards of ISP Immunity Under Section 230 of the Communications 
Decency Act, 20 GEO. MASON L. REV. 275, 287 (2012). 
 172. See, e.g., Patricia Spiccia, Note, The Best Things in Life Are Not Free: Why Immunity 
Under Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act Should Be Earned and Not Freely Given, 
48 VAL. U. L. REV. 369, 393–96 (2013); Michael H. Spencer, Defamatory E-Mail and Employer 
Liability: Why Razing Zeran v. America Online Is a Good Thing, 6 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 25, 92 (2000) 
(referring to the conclusion in Zeran that distributors were protected by section 230 and stating 
“this is not what Congress meant by enacting the CDA”); Melissa A. Troiano, Comment, The New 
Journalism? Why Traditional Defamation Laws Should Apply to Internet Blogs, 55 AM. U. L. REV. 
1447, 1457 (2006); Lee, supra note 87, at 476; Fritts, supra note 170, at 779. 
 173. See Spiccia, supra note 172, at 386 (“[T]he legislative history and text of section 230 
suggests that the statute’s scope is narrow—applying only to defamation claims and good faith 
efforts to self-regulate—[and that] the Fourth Circuit in Zeran v. America Online, Inc. rejected such 
a narrow reading of the statute and instead broadly construed the scope of section 230’s immunity 
to apply to claims other than defamation.”). 
 174. Sheridan, supra note 80, at 162. 
 175. Id. at 165. 
 176. The Seventh Circuit also criticized the Zeran court’s broad interpretation of section 230 
and suggested that, were it to be confronted with the same question, it might read section 230 
differently. See Doe v. GTE Corp., 347 F.3d 655, 659–60 (7th Cir. 2003). 
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Zeran court accurately pointed out that distributors are often treated as 
a subcategory of publishers, and therefore they fit within the class of 
“publishers” that Congress meant to immunize under section 230.177 
Furthermore, one could plausibly argue that immunity from treatment 
as, or liability as, a publisher means immunity from the act of 
publication (making content available to a third party who can 
understand it) regardless of a publishing party’s status as a “publisher” 
or “distributor.” 
The findings and policy statements of section 230, particularly 
subsection (a)(3) and (a)(4), which state that “the [i]nternet . . . 
offer[s] a forum for a true diversity of political discourse” and that “the 
[i]nternet  . . . ha[s] flourished . . . with a minimum of government 
regulation” also support the Zeran and Barrett interpretation.178 These 
passages suggest that Congress aimed to ensure the protection of the 
Internet as a “forum for a true diversity of political discourse” by 
preserving an environment free of burdensome liability and 
regulations.179 
A desire to keep the internet free of regulation indicates an intent 
to convey significant protections to providers and users of interactive 
computer services in order to ensure that the government does not play 
a significant role in monitoring content online. If immunity were 
limited to the class of entities that qualify as true publishers, i.e., the 
class of entities that makes editorial adjustments to content, then the 
statute’s protections would be very limited. As a result, the statute 
would probably not provide the extensive protections that Congress 
envisioned were necessary to protect small businesses online. 
Most significantly though, statements made by Christopher Cox 
and Ron Wyden, the drafters of section 230, also show that Zeran and 
Barrett correctly interpreted the statute. In 2017, when asked whether 
section 230 was intended to convey immunity like that described in 
Zeran, Wyden answered, “[a]bsolutely . . . . ‘[W]e said very bluntly 
 
 177. Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 332 (4th Cir. 1997). 
 178. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(a)(3)–(4) (2018). 
 179. See id. § 230(a)–(b); see also 141 CONG. REC. 22045 (1995) (statement of Rep. Cox) 
(“[Section 230] will establish as the policy of the United States that we do not wish to have content 
regulation by the Federal Government of what is on the Internet, that we do not wish to have a 
Federal Computer Commission with an army of bureaucrats regulating the Internet because frankly 
the Internet has grown up to be what it is without that kind of help from the Government.”). But 
see Lukmire, supra note 66, at 383–85 (arguing that the primary purpose of section 230 was to 
protect minors online, not to create an open market for expression on the internet). 
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that we thought it would freeze innovation if someone who owned a 
website could be personally liable.’”180 Moreover, Christopher Cox 
has been described as having said that “when he wrote Section 230, he 
intended to protect companies such as America Online, Prodigy, 
CompuServe, and other services that handle large volumes of traffic 
and allow users to post content.”181 These statements by now Senator 
Ron Wyden and former U.S. Representative Christopher Cox directly 
support the Zeran and Barrett interpretations of the statute. 
These considerations provide a legitimate basis to conclude that 
Zeran, and later Barrett, correctly interpreted section 230 and that the 
statute, as written, protects both publishers and distributors. 
B.  Courts Correctly Interpreted Section 230 by Applying It to Block 
Enforcement of Injunctions Against Providers and Users of 
Interactive Computer Services 
The next interpretive question with respect to section 230 is 
whether courts properly interpreted it to provide immunity from 
injunctions. The scope of immunity provided by section 230, shown 
by the case law discussed in Part II, has largely been determined under 
a combination of subsection (c)(1), which prohibits courts from 
treating providers and users of interactive computer services as 
publishers and distributors; subsection (c)(2), which provides that 
“[n]o provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be held 
liable on account of . . . [action taken to restrict access to content]”; 
and subsection (e)(3), which states that “[n]o cause of action may be 
brought and no liability may be imposed under any . . . law that is 
inconsistent with this section.”182 
One line of reasoning supporting the conclusion that the statute 
does bar some injunctions was addressed by the court in Kathleen R. 
In that case, the court looked to subsections (c)(1) and (e)(3) to 
conclude that section 230 does immunize defendants from injunctive 
relief if the injunctive relief is obtained through a state law cause of 
action that treats a defendant protected by subsection (c)(1) as a 
publisher or distributor.183 
 
 180. KOSSEFF, supra note 3, at 95. 
 181. Id. at 114. 
 182. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1)–(2), (e)(3). 
 183. Kathleen R. v. City of Livermore, 104 Cal. Rptr. 2d 772, 780–81 (Ct. App. 2001). 
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The basis for this conclusion is that subsection (e)(3), by its terms, 
immunizes defendants from all state law actions that are inconsistent 
with section 230.184 This immunity includes actions inconsistent with 
subsection (c)(1), which protects defendants from treatment as 
“publisher[s] or speaker[s] of any information.”185 Thus, an injunction 
relating to the removal of content online that is obtained through a 
state law cause of action is by definition inconsistent with section 230 
because it treats a provider or user of an interactive computer service 
protected by subsection (c)(1) as a publisher or speaker of information 
provided by another information content provider. 
This position makes sense, given the linguistic and logical 
construction of the statute. It also provides a clear answer to the 
question of whether section 230 can be used to immunize a defendant 
from an injunction in certain cases. 
However, as addressed in Part II, the Kathleen R. analysis of the 
statute also leaves one question unanswered: whether section 230 
immunity protects against all injunctions or whether it just protects 
against injunctions obtained under state law causes of action alleged 
against defendants protected by subsection (c)(1).186 The Kathleen R. 
court even noted this remaining ambiguity. In dicta it suggested that 
defendants protected under subsection (c)(2) of the statute might only 
be protected from claims for damages because, unlike subsection 
(c)(1), subsection (c)(2) includes the limiting title “civil liability” and 
the limiting phrase “no provider or user of an interactive computer 
service shall be held liable.”187 According to the court, this suggested 
that subsection (c)(2) “refer[ed] only to damage claims.”188 
In Hassell, a plurality of the California Supreme Court resolved 
this remaining ambiguity and found that the phrase “no liability may 
be imposed” in section (e)(3) was broad enough to bar injunctions.189 
While the judgment in Hassell is binding on California courts, because 
this Note is concerned with determining the most logically sound 
interpretation of section 230, this Note considers whether the court 
was correct to interpret the phrase “no liability may be imposed” as 
immunizing defendants from injunctive relief. 
 
 184. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(3). 
 185. Id. § 230(c)(1). 
 186. See supra Part III.B. 
 187. Kathleen R., 104 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 780–81; see 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2). 
 188. Kathleen R., 104 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 780–81. 
 189. Hassell III, 420 P.3d 776, 792 (Cal. 2018); see 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(3). 
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To determine whether the California Supreme Court accurately 
interpreted the statute, the most important arguments to consider are 
those addressed by the California Court of Appeal, which concluded 
that the injunction did not violate section 230, and those offered by the 
dissenting supreme court justices in Hassell. 
In reaching its conclusion that the injunction against Yelp was not 
barred by section 230, the court of appeal focused on two points. First, 
it considered whether Hassell had brought a cause of action against 
Yelp.190 If it had, then the injunction was plainly barred by Kathleen 
R., which correctly interpreted subsection (e)(3) to block causes of 
action inconsistent with section 230.191 However, the court concluded 
that Hassell had not brought a cause of action against Yelp because 
the injunction was not a cause of action but a remedy.192 The only 
cause of action brought in the case was the one brought directly against 
Bird.193 This is a plausible view on its face. However, the supreme 
court disagreed. Picking up on an important point, the supreme court 
observed that subsection (e)(3) never actually specifies that a cause of 
action inconsistent with section 230 must be alleged against the 
provider or user of interactive computer services in order for immunity 
to apply.194 Instead, the statute provides only that “[n]o cause of action 
may be brought and no liability may be imposed . . . that is 
inconsistent with this section.”195 
Section 230 does not say that a cause of action must be alleged 
against the provider or user of interactive computer services protected 
by the statute for immunity to apply. Instead, subsection (e)(3) says 
that immunity applies to providers and users of interactive computer 
services if a cause of action is brought against anyone so long as that 
cause of action also imposes liability inconsistent with section 230 on 
a provider or user of interactive computer services. 
In sum, the supreme court got it right. By its plain meaning, the 
phrase “no cause of action may be brought” does not support the view 
that subsection (e)(3)’s immunity is limited to cases in which a cause 
of action is alleged directly against a provider or user of an interactive 
computer service. 
 
 190. Hassell I, 203 Cal. Rptr. 3d 203, 225–26 (Ct. App. 2016), rev’d, 420 P.3d 776 (Cal. 2018). 
 191. See supra Part III.B. 
 192. Hassell I, 203 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 226–27. 
 193. Id. at 226. 
 194. Hassell III, 420 P.3d at 790–91. 
 195. 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(3) (2018). 
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The second point that the court of appeal considered in 
determining whether section 230 immunized Yelp from an injunction 
was whether the order issued in the default judgment against Bird 
imposed liability on Yelp that was inconsistent with the statute and 
thus whether Yelp was immunized under the “no liability may be 
imposed” clause of subsection (e)(3).196 It found that the order neither 
qualified as an imposition of liability on Yelp nor an imposition of 
liability inconsistent with section 230.197 
In support of the first conclusion the court stated, “[if] an 
injunction is itself a form of liability, that liability was imposed on 
Bird, not Yelp.”198 To support its second finding, that even if this was 
liability it was not inconsistent with section 230, the court contended 
that if Yelp violated the injunction, the violation would not result in 
Yelp being treated as a publisher or distributor under subsection 
(c)(1).199 The court justified this second position by stating that the 
consequence of a violation of the order was a contempt proceeding, 
which is not a civil action pertaining to publisher liability for 
defamatory content, but a criminal penalty that stems from the 
violation of a civil order.200 Accordingly, the court concluded that 
Yelp was not immunized by either of the clauses in subsection 
(e)(3).201 
Both positions seem plausible. However, the first issue with these 
arguments is that they likely misconstrue the meaning of the word 
liability. To understand why this is the case, one can look to the Justice 
Cuéllar’s dissent in Hassell. Like the court of appeal, Justice Cuéllar 
argued that the term “liability” was narrow and that Congress only 
intended it to mean “financial obligation[s], such as the responsibility 
to pay damages.”202 As support, Justice Cuéllar cited a case listed in 
Black’s Law Dictionary that defined liability as “‘legally obligated or 
accountable,’ or a ‘financial or pecuniary obligation in a specified 
amount.’”203 The plurality took the opposite position. They concluded 
 
 196. Hassell I, 203 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 225–26. 
 197. Id. at 226. 
 198. Id. at 227. 
 199. Id. at 226. 
 200. Id. at 227 (quoting Freeman v. Superior Ct., 282 P.2d 857, 859 (Cal. 1955)). 
 201. Id. 
 202. Hassell III, 420 P.3d 776, 811 (Cal. 2018) (Cuéllar, J., dissenting). 
 203. Id. (quoting Liability, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014)). In addition, Justice 
Cuéllar pointed to Congress’s concern with “tort liability,” not liability generally, in support of his 
argument that section 230 immunity extended only to financial obligations. See id. 
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that the term liability included “almost every character of hazard or 
responsibility, absolute, contingent, or likely.”204 
These conflicting definitions of liability suggest that there is a 
genuine controversy over the meaning of the term liability, and 
therefore, ambiguity in the statute that the court of appeal picked up 
on, but that was never considered by the plurality in the supreme court 
opinion. However, Justice Cuéllar’s argument, and by analogy the 
argument made by the court of appeal, are not based on solid ground. 
There is not much support for the view that liability, in any context, is 
limited to financial obligations. 
Intriguingly, the lack of support for Justice Cuéllar’s argument 
and for the court of appeal’s position is evidenced by the source Justice 
Cuéllar cites in support of his view, Black’s Law Dictionary. Almost 
every example in Black’s Law Dictionary describes liability as a term 
that extends beyond financial obligations.205 In fact, only two of the 
thirty plus cases cited to in Black’s Law Dictionary Sixth Edition that 
define the word “liability” suggest that the term is limited to 
damages.206 Interestingly, even one of the definitions Justice Cuéllar 
points to, that liability means “legally obligated,”207 does not limit the 
meaning of “liability” to financial obligations because an “obligation” 
need not be an obligation to pay a debt.208 
The court of appeal’s second position—that the second clause of 
subsection (e)(3) did not immunize Yelp from the injunction because 
even if liability were imposed that liability was not inconsistent with 
section 230209—is also problematic. As addressed above, the court of 
appeal stated that if Yelp violated the injunction, the penalty would be 
 
 204. Id. at 791 (plurality opinion) (quoting Liability, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 
1990)). 
 205. See, e.g., Liability, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990) (citing to cases defining 
liability as “a broad legal term . . . [that] has been referred to as of the most comprehensive 
significance, including almost every character of hazard or responsibility, absolute, contingent, or 
likely”; “[the] condition of . . . potentially [being] subject to an obligation”; “[a] legal 
responsibility”). 
 206. Id. (first citing State v. Fischl, 20 P.2d 1057, 1059 (Mont. 1933), overruled in part by 44 
P.2d 747 (Mont. 1935); then citing Erickson v. Grande Ronde Lumber Co., 92 P.2d 170, 174 (Or. 
1939)). 
 207. Hassell III, 420 P.3d at 811 (Cuéllar, J., dissenting). 
 208. Another important point to consider is that one of the next terms in Black’s Sixth Edition 
is the term “Liability for damages.” This suggests that liability for damages is generally distinct 
from liability that is limited to damages. See Liability for damages, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 
(6th ed. 1990). 
 209. Hassell I, 203 Cal. Rptr. 3d 203, 226–27 (Ct. App. 2016), rev’d, 420 P.3d 776 (Cal. 2018). 
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a contempt proceeding, which is a criminal penalty, not a civil 
penalty.210 Because of this, the court concluded that contempt would 
not treat Yelp as a publisher and, therefore, would be consistent with 
the statute.211 This interpretation misses a significant point. Subsection 
(c)(1) prevents courts from treating providers and users of interactive 
computer services as publishers and distributors of content provided 
by a third party.212 Unlike subsection (c)(2), it makes no mention of 
the word “civil liability.”213 Accordingly, even if we grant that a 
contempt proceeding is a criminal penalty, it is still a penalty that 
“treats” Yelp as a publisher or distributor by virtue of the fact that it 
penalizes Yelp for failure to comply with a defamation judgement. In 
fact, contempt for failure to comply with a court order is the exact kind 
of legal obligation that publishers face when they refuse to remove 
defamatory content.214 
Given the problems with the argument that section 230 does not 
create the immunity described in Hassell, there is a good reason to 
believe that the supreme court’s plurality opinion properly interpreted 
the term “liability” to encompass obligations stemming from 
injunctions. Accordingly, the Hassell plurality’s approach to section 
230 offers the most logical understanding of the protections provided 
by section 230.215 
 
 210. Id. at 227 (stating that contempt is not a civil penalty). 
 211. Id. 
 212. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2018). 
 213. See id. 
 214. See Balboa Island Vill. Inn, Inc. v. Lemen, 156 P.3d 339, 353 (Cal. 2007) (enjoining 
defendant from repeating statements previously found to be defamatory). Another problem with 
the court of appeal’s interpretation of section 230 in Hassell is that, logically speaking, it means 
that an injunction can never amount to liability under section 230. See Application of Change.org, 
Engine, Github, Inc., A Medium Corporation, Patreon, Inc., Sitejabber, and Wikimedia Foundation, 
Inc. for Leave to File Amici Curiae Brief and Amici Curiae Brief in Support of Appellant at 32, 
Hassell III, 420 P.3d 776 (Cal. 2018) (No. S235968) (stating that if the supreme court adopted the 
holding of the court of appeal, then “direct injunctions against named parties would also fail to 
constitute ‘liability’ because they . . . [would] only create a duty to act or face contempt-of-court 
charges”). 
 215. Although the plurality in Hassell was largely correct in their interpretation of section 230, 
their interrogation of the question of what “liability” meant could have been bolstered by further 
analysis. Instead of using Black’s Law Dictionary as their lone source of authority, the plurality 
might have made a more convincing case for their point of view if they had supplemented their 
opinion by looking to other statutes that use the term “liability” to confer immunity from suit. This 
would have elicited a broader survey of case law and provided substantially more support for the 
plurality’s conclusion. Multiple statutes rely on the phrase “immunity from liability” to establish 
immunity from suit. For example, the California state nuisance statute provides that “a person who 
operates or uses a sport shooting range in this state shall not be subject to civil liability . . . in any 
matter relating to noise or noise pollution,” and that certain noise rules and regulations do not apply 
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C.  The Unwanted Effects of the Logical Interpretation of Section 
230 
In light of the considerations discussed above, the most well-
reasoned interpretations of section 230 are probably the ones that 
currently control in California courts. Zeran, Barrett, Kathleen R., and 
Hassell track the language of the statute effectively and are not subject 
to the objections that weaken the interpretations of section 230 offered 
by the lower courts in Hassell and Barrett.216 
With that said, the Zeran, Barrett, Kathleen R., and Hassell 
opinions also have some negative consequences. They leave courts in 
the difficult position of being unable to enforce valid court orders 
when a third-party content provider, like Bird, refuses to comply with 
court orders or cannot be identified.217 In other words, under the 
combined protections of Zeran, Barrett, Kathleen R., and Hassell, 
courts must set aside legitimate findings of defamation because of a 
statute that conveys seemingly limitless immunity.218 
 
to “shooting range exempted from liability under this section.” CAL. CIV. CODE § 3482.1(b)(1), 
(3) (Deering 2020). Because the remedy for nuisance may in certain circumstances be an injunction, 
see, e.g., Estancias Dall. Corp. v. Schultz, 500 S.W.2d 217, 217 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973), this statute 
must be read to immunize shooting ranges from injunctions. 47 CAL. JUR. 3D Nuisances § 87, 
Westlaw (database updated Nov. 2020) (stating that “a court will not enjoin the use or operation of 
a range, on the basis of noise or noise pollution”). Therefore, California Civil Code § 3482.1(b)(1), 
(b)(3) treats injunctions as an imposition of “liability.” Another similar example is the Protection 
of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act (PLCAA), which protects weapons manufacturers from 
qualified “civil liability” for injuries caused by their products. 15 U.S.C. § 7902(a) (2018). The 
PLCAA expressly defines “civil liability” as including “injunctive or declaratory relief.” Id. 
§ 7903(5)(A). With this said, there is one case that, on its face, appears to present an exception to 
the rule that the term “liability” includes the obligations stemming from injunctions. However, 
when analyzed closely it does not disagree with this generally held view. In section 402A of the 
Restatement Second of Torts, a seller of a defective product is “subject to liability for physical harm 
thereby caused to the ultimate user.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (AM. LAW INST. 
1965) (emphasis added). Courts typically do not interpret the term “liability” in section 402A to 
allow plaintiffs to obtain an injunction in products liability cases. See Jill Wieber Lens, Product 
Recalls: Why Is Tort Law Deferring to Agency Inaction?, 90 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 329, 338 n.40 
(2016) (discussing the fact that most courts refuse to grant injunctive relief in product liability 
cases). However, it would not be accurate to describe this as an exception to the general rule that 
the term “liability” includes injunctive relief because courts do not categorically bar injunctions 
under section 402A and do not construe it to limit plaintiffs to recovery for monetary damages. 
Instead, when interpreting this provision, courts have repeatedly found that injunctions are not 
categorically barred, but rather that they are not the most appropriate remedy in such cases. Id. (first 
citing Walsh v. Ford Motor Co., 130 F.R.D. 260, 266 (D.D.C. 1990); and then Rhynes v. Stryker 
Corp., No. 10-5619 SC, 2011 WL 2149095, at *3 (N.D. Cal. May 31, 2011)). 
 216. See supra Parts III.A, III.B (discussing the California Supreme Court opinions in Hassell 
and Barrett, which overturned the California Court of Appeal in both cases and provided persuasive 
justifications for doing so). 
 217. See supra Parts II.D, II.E. 
 218. See supra Part II. 
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While the harm done in Hassell was minimal, a relatively tame 
Yelp review stayed online, other similar cases have had more tragic 
results. For example, in Batzel v. Smith,219 the plaintiff, Batzel, was 
accused by a disgruntled contractor of possessing art stolen by the 
Nazis in World War II and of being a descendant of Heinrich 
Himmler.220 The contractor provided this false information to an art 
theft website that then published the allegation.221 The post, despite 
being demonstrably false, severely damaged Batzel’s personal and 
professional reputation.222 However, Batzel was barred from 
recovering from the art theft website despite its active role in 
publishing the unverified and malicious post.223 
In another disturbing case, an individual created a fake dating 
profile on Matchmaker.com posing as the actress Christianne 
Carafano (more commonly known by her stage name Chase 
Masterson).224 The profile featured Carafano’s home address and 
some personal information about her.225 It also included a fake “Q&A” 
in which the imposter, posing as Carafano, wrote that she “was 
looking for a ‘hard and dominant’ man with ‘a strong sexual appetite’ 
and that she ‘liked sort of be[ ]ing controlled by a man, in and out of 
bed.’”226 When other users sent private messages to the profile, they 
received automated responses that included Masterson’s home phone 
number.227 Masterson received various threatening messages on her 
phone as well as the following fax: 
CHASE, GOOD NEWS HORNY BITCH! I WILL GIVE 
YOU THE FUCK OF YOUR LIFE! BUT FIRST I WILL 
ELIMINATE YOUR CHILD THAT GETS YOUR WET 
PUSSY IN HEAT. I KNOW WHERE YOU ARE. I’LL 
FIND YOU. IF YOU TRY TO ESCAPE. A PERSON LIKE 
 
 219. 333 F.3d 1018 (9th Cir. 2003), superseded in part by statute on other grounds, S.B. 515, 
2003–2004 Sess. (Cal. 2003), CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.17(e) (Deering 2020). 
 220. KOSSEFF, supra note 3, at 105–06. 
 221. Batzel, 333 F.3d at 1022. 
 222. KOSSEFF, supra note 3, at 106–08. 
 223. Batzel, 333 F.3d at 1030–31 (court finding that the art theft website qualified as a provider 
or user of an interactive computer service); see Doe v. GTE Corp., 347 F.3d 655, 655 (7th Cir. 
2003). 
 224. KOSSEFF, supra note 3, at 115–16. 
 225. Id. at 116. 
 226. Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d 1119, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (alteration in 
original). 
 227. KOSSEFF, supra note 3, at 116–17. 
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YOU IS EASY PREY FOR ME. . . . IT’S HUNT 
SEASON!228 
Deeply disturbed by the threat, Carafano fled her home to protect 
herself and her son.229 She then tried to have the profile deleted, but 
the website initially refused to remove it.230 Carafano sued.231 But 
section 230 barred her cause of action from proceeding, and the 
website prevailed on summary judgment.232 
These sorts of cases are far from rare,233 and they expose a 
drawback of section 230’s protections. The cost of a vibrant, 
unfettered marketplace of ideas and entrepreneurship online fostered 
by section 230 is that it leaves persons targeted by malicious actors 
online without remedy or recourse for trauma and irreparable harm. 
D.  Proposed Modifications to Section 230 
Given the downsides of section 230’s immunity, there has been 
no shortage of proposals to modify the statute. For example, academic 
commentators suggest various legislative changes to address some of 
the problems section 230 created.234 One such proposal is to repeal 
section 230 and apply the common-law principles of defamation law 
to online defamation.235 
Proponents of this approach argue that the common law provides 
better remedies for plaintiffs and places the internet on a level playing 
field with radio, TV, and print news.236 However, these arguments do 
not take into account the concern that companies, subject to the 
 
 228. Id. at 115–16 (quoting Appellant’s Opening Brief at 5–6, Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, 
Inc., 339 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir. 2003) (No. 02-55658)). 
 229. Id. at 117. 
 230. Carafano, 339 F.3d at 1122. 
 231. Id. 
 232. Id. at 1125. 
 233. See, e.g., Jane Doe No. 1 v. Backpage.com, LLC, 817 F.3d 12, 17–29 (1st Cir. 2016) 
(denying plaintiff recovery against Backpage.com when plaintiff demonstrated that she was 
trafficked through an advertisement posted on the Backpage website); Doe v. GTE Corp., 347 F.3d 
655, 659 (7th Cir. 2003) (immunizing GTE Corp. from liability for hosting a website that contained 
surreptitiously recorded videos of male athletes changing in a locker room); Doe v. MySpace, Inc., 
528 F.3d 413, 415 (5th Cir. 2008) (dismissing plaintiff’s claim against defendant MySpace.com 
which alleged that MySpace.com was negligent because it failed to verify plaintiff’s age before she 
joined the site). 
 234. See, e.g., Heather Saint, Note, Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act: The True 
Culprit of Internet Defamation, 36 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 39, 66 (2015) (recommending return to 
the common law approach to defamation liability online); Spiccia, supra note 172, at 413. 
   235.  See Saint, supra note 234, at 66; Jeweler, supra note 65, at 1, 3. 
 236. Jeweler, supra note 65, at 23 (noting that “the common law framework would best serve 
the . . . Internet . . . without totally precluding recovery for defamation [online]”). 
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uncertain boundaries of judge-made law, would, as experts in the 
1990s predicted, either completely discontinue monitoring content to 
hide behind distributor protections or, in the alternative, engage in 
massive censorship.237 Another risk that might stem from this 
approach is that it might not even expand remedies for plaintiffs 
because providers and users of interactive computer services that 
refuse to moderate, the most natural areas for malicious actors to 
congregate online, would still be protected from liability as they would 
qualify as “distributors” under the common-law framework.238 
Another problem with eliminating section 230 protections is that 
doing so would likely pose a significant danger to internet commerce. 
In fact, one study estimated that a reduction in intermediary 
protections online, like section 230, would destroy hundreds of 
thousands of jobs and billions of dollars in value.239 
 
 237. Matt Laslo, The Fight Over Section 230—and the Internet as We Know It, WIRED 
(Aug. 13, 2019, 3:18 PM), https://www.wired.com/story/fight-over-section-230-internet-as-we-
know-it/ (explaining that one of the arguments put forth in support of enacting section 230 was that 
without it “companies could be held responsible for all the content . . . users posted simply because 
they moderated some of it” and that if they were held liable, “they wouldn’t moderate anything at 
all”); cf. KOSSEFF, supra note 3, at 272 (explaining that a “knowledge” based view of liability under 
section 230 would result in either mass censorship or a dialing down of moderation). Most 
significantly, the hypothesis that eliminating immunity protections under section 230 would result 
in censorship was tested and largely proved true in 2016 following the passage of the Stop Enabling 
Sex Traffickers Act and Allow States and Victims to Fight Online Sex Trafficking Act (FOSTA-
SESTA). FOSTA-SESTA created a carveout to immunity under section 230 for providers of 
interactive computer services that “knowingly assist[ed], support[ed], or facilitate[ed]” sex 
trafficking online. KOSSEFF, supra note 3, at 270. The result was that even large platforms like 
Craigslist, Reddit, Tumblr, Microsoft and Google shut down pages, deleted material, and put in 
place auto-detection filters to ban legal sexual content because of the risk that they could be held 
liable for sex trafficking under the carveout. See Paris Martineau, Tumblr’s Porn Ban Reveals Who 
Controls What We See Online, WIRED (Dec. 4, 2018, 2:07 PM), https://www.wired.com/story/tu
mblrs-porn-ban-reveals-controls-we-see-online/ (explaining why Tumblr responded to FOSTA-
SESTA by barring pornography); see also Samantha Cole, Craigslist Just Nuked Its Personal 
Ads Section Because of a Sex-Trafficking Bill, VICE (Mar. 23, 2018, 5:18 AM), 
https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/wj75ab/craigslist-personal-ads-sesta-fosta (stating that 
Craigslist eliminated its “Personals” section in response to FOSTA-SESTA); Aja Romano, A New 
Law Intended to Curb Sex Trafficking Threatens the Future of the Internet as We Know It, VOX 
(July 2, 2018, 1:08 PM), https://www.vox.com/culture/2018/4/13/17172762/fosta-sesta-backpage-
230-internet-freedom (addressing Reddit’s decision to delete multiple subreddits, Google’s choice 
to delete content directly from Drive accounts, and Microsoft’s addition of auto-deletion features 
to Skype in response to FOSTA-SESTA). 
 238. See supra Part II.B (explaining that publisher liability does not apply to parties that publish 
but do not exercise editorial control over content); see also Jonathan A. Friedman & Francis M. 
Buono, Limiting Tort Liability for Online Third-Party Content Under Section 230 of the 
Communications Act, 52 FED. COMMC’NS L.J. 647, 651 (2000) (noting that distributors are not 
liable unless they know or have reason to know that content is defamatory). 
 239. Christian M. Dippon, Economic Value of Internet Intermediaries and the Role of Liability 
Protections, INTERNET ASS’N 2 (June 5, 2017), https://internetassociation.org/wp-
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Another concern with returning to the common-law framework is 
that doing so would impose a heavy burden on providers and users of 
interactive computer services to moderate content. Facebook, for 
example, already hires over ten thousand people to police and delete 
material on its platform.240 If sites like Facebook could be sued for all 
defamatory content posted by users, they might struggle to sustain 
themselves in their current forms. 
Given the problems with a return to the common-law framework, 
others argue that the proper strategy to better protect plaintiffs under 
section 230 is to leave the statute in place but add a “notice and 
takedown provision,” like that included in the Digital Millennium 
Copyright Act (DMCA).241 These commentators argue that such a 
provision would provide better remedies for victims of online 
defamation as it would permit them to petition providers and users of 
interactive computer services to remove content that petitioners find 
objectionable.242 
While this proposal probably creates fewer risks than a return to 
the common law, it is also problematic. Under the existing DMCA 
takedown provisions, providers of internet services must comply with 
“valid” removal requests by rights holders in order to retain protection 
from copyright lawsuits.243 This leads to the removal of allegedly 
infringing content by technology platforms and websites without any 
formal adjudication as to whether the content actually infringes upon 




 240. Anita Balakrishnan, Facebook Pledges to Double Its 10,000-Person Safety and Security 
Staff by the End of 2018, CNBC (Oct. 31, 2017, 7:59 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/10/31/fac
ebook-senate-testimony-doubling-security-group-to-20000-in-2018.html (last updated Nov. 1, 
2017, 9:26 AM).  
 241. See David E. Hallett, Article, How to Destroy a Reputation and Get Away With It: The 
Communication Decency Act Examined: Do the Policies and Standards Set Out in the Digital 
Millennium Copyright Act Provide a Solution for a Person Defamed Online?, 41 IDEA 259, 279–
80 (2001); Alison Virginia King, Note, Constitutionality of Cyberbullying Laws: Keeping the 
Online Playground Safe for Both Teens and Free Speech, 63 VAND. L. REV. 845, 878 (2010); see 
also Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998) (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C. and 28 U.S.C.). 
 242. King, supra note 241, at 878. 
 243. Jonathan Band & Matthew Schruers, Safe Harbors Against the Liability Hurricane: The 
Communications Decency Act and the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 20 CARDOZO ARTS & 
ENT. L.J. 295, 304–05 (2002); see 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(C) (2018). 
 244. Wendy Seltzer, Free Speech Unmoored in Copyright’s Safe Harbor: Chilling Effects of 
the DMCA on the First Amendment, 24 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 171, 173–74 (2010). For a concrete 
example of this kind of violation, the McCain/Palin campaign, see id. at 174. 
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speech online, particularly in areas where First Amendment law is 
unclear, and service providers must make a difficult judgment as to 
whether to take down content.245 
A similar provision in section 230 would likely result in the same 
problem emerging again, but in an area of the law, defamation, where 
litigious plaintiffs have a strong incentive to eliminate speech that they 
find objectionable or critical. The result of this approach would be that 
the duty of adjudicating defamation online would fall into the hands 
of providers and users of interactive computer services who, 
confronted with the unenviable task of making difficult determinations 
about the legality of purportedly defamatory content, would almost 
certainly overcensor and cave to the demands of well-resourced 
plaintiffs.246 Accordingly, this solution, although appealing in its 
ability to protect plaintiffs, poses a threat to free expression online. 
Another proposed solution is to adopt the proposal above but with 
the caveat that takedown requests be subject to government 
oversight.247 For example, one commentator proposed that section 230 
should include, in addition to a provision authorizing takedown of 
content, a section requiring the Federal Communications Commission 
to review takedown requests.248 Those supporting this position argue 
that this extra layer of protection for online speech would ensure that 
aggressive plaintiffs could not remove legitimate but unpopular online 
content because an independent adjudicator, not subject to pressures 
easily foisted on providers and users of interactive computer services, 
would be required to review removal requests and delete material only 
if the adjudicator finds that the material could “reasonably be deemed 
defamatory.”249 This proposal is also an appealing approach. 
However, it runs contrary to one of the foundational aims of section 
230—to ensure freedom of expression online and to guarantee that 
federal officials do not determine what constitutes legitimate 
speech.250 This proposal might also run into a constitutional gray area 
 
 245. Id. at 177–78 (arguing that the DMCA operates as a “prior restraint by proxy” under which 
rights holders are often able to obtain the removal of allegedly infringing content even in cases 
where the content is not infringing on intellectual property). 
 246. See supra note 237. 
 247. Spiccia, supra note 172, at 413. 
 248. Id. 
 249. Id. 
 250. See 141 CONG. REC. 22045 (1995) (statement of Rep. Cox). 
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because it could result in removal of speech without any adjudicative 
proceeding beforehand.251 
In addition to the academic commentators who have proposed 
changes to section 230, some politicians also advocate for significant 
adjustments to the statute. For example, Senator Josh Hawley of 
Missouri introduced a bill in the Senate in 2019 that seeks to eliminate 
section 230 immunity for large providers of interactive computer 
services, unless government audits find their content-removal 
practices to be “politically neutral.”252 
Although this approach appears to work to ensure that content 
online is not defamatory, it may also be a problematic solution in light 
of section 230’s intent and has run into significant opposition from 
free speech advocates as well as industry groups.253 By leveraging 
immunity against a determination of political neutrality established by 
government audits, it is also at odds with the spirit of section 230, 
which was written, in part, to keep government regulators from 
policing content online.254 Another point to flag is that, because this 
solution retains immunity for “neutral” platforms, it still does not 
enhance the remedies for plaintiffs defamed on platforms that fit 
within the government’s definition of neutrality. 
E.  An Alternative Solution 
The discussion in section D of various proposals to modify 
section 230 suggests that many of the proposed changes to the statute 
 
 251. Seltzer, supra note 244, at 175 (discussing why the DMCA take-down provisions (which 
this proposal mirrors) may be an illegal prior restraint on speech because it allows removal of 
content online without a “judicial determination of its infringing nature”). 
 252. Senator Hawley Introduces Legislation to Amend Section 230 Immunity for Big Tech 
Companies, JOSH HAWLEY U.S. SENATOR FOR MO. (June 19, 2019), 
https://www.hawley.senate.gov/senator-hawley-introduces-legislation-amend-section-230-
immunity-big-tech-companies. 
 253. Peter Suderman, The Moral Scolds of the New Illiberal Rights Are Coming for Your 
Internet, REASON (June 25, 2019, 10:44 AM), https://reason.com/2019/06/25/the-moral-scolds-
new-illiberal-right-internet-hawley-230/; Elizabeth Nolan Brown, Josh Hawley Introduces Bill to 
Put Washington in Charge of Internet Speech, REASON (June 19, 2019, 12:05 PM), 
https://reason.com/2019/06/19/josh-hawley-introduces-bill-to-put-washington-in-charge-of-
internet-speech/. 
 254. 141 CONG. REC. 22045 (1995) (statement of Rep. Cox) (“Some have suggested . . . that 
we take the Federal Communications Commission and turn it into the Federal Computer 
Commission, that we hire even more bureaucrats and more regulators who will attempt, either 
civilly or criminally, to punish people by catching them in the act of putting something into 
cyberspace. Frankly, there is just too much going on on the Internet for that to be effective. No 
matter how big the army of bureaucrats, it is not going to protect my kids because I do not think 
the Federal Government will get there in time.”). 
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are “big picture” solutions that propose major modifications to the 
statute. As a result, these solutions create substantial risks in terms of 
their ability to impact the internet’s commercial ecosystem that forms 
an integral part of the American economy.255 Accordingly, this Note 
proposes a modification to section 230 that is more modest than those 
described above. This proposal incorporates the lessons learned from 
case law discussed in this Note. 
This proposal provides plaintiffs who have prevailed in court on 
defamation claims the right to enforce their legitimately obtained 
remedies. It also requires that the claims endure the scrutiny of formal 
court proceedings before any liability may be imposed. These features 
allow this proposal to avoid infringing upon speech rights online and 
to avoid subjecting providers and users of interactive computer 
services to burdensome litigation. Unlike some of the other proposals 
discussed in this Note, this proposal also averts the danger of 
governmental overreach in the regulation of speech online—one of the 
fundamental policy objectives of section 230.256 
The proposal suggests adding the following provision to section 
230. For reasons of convenience, the added provision assumes a 
position near the bottom of the statute, below the current subsection 
(e) but in place of the current subsection (f). The current subsection (f) 
would become subsection (g). 
(f)  Removal of Content Posted by a Third Party 
(1) Injunctive Relief: 42 U.S.C. § 230 shall not be read to 
prevent a plaintiff that brings a cause of action for defamation 
against an information content provider from, in that action, 
obtaining injunctive relief against a provider or user of an 
interactive computer service when the provider of or user of 
the interactive computer services has been given reasonable 
notice of the action against the information content provider, 
and the injunctive relief requires the provider or user of the 
interactive computer services to remove— 
(A) content adjudged to be defamatory in a proceeding 
described in section (f)(1); or 
 
 255. See Dippon, supra note 239. 
 256. See supra note 254. 
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(B) content substantially identical to content already 
adjudged to be defamatory in a proceeding described in 
section (f)(1). 
(2) Limits on Relief: The injunctive relief described in 
subsection (f) shall have no force against a provider or user of 
interactive computer services, unless— 
(A) the party that obtained the injunction takes reasonable 
steps to obtain removal of the defamatory content by the 
third-party information content provider and 
(B) demonstrates, after taking reasonable steps to procure 
removal by the information content provider, that the 
information content provider is unable or unwilling to 
remove the content or that the information content provider 
removed it and reposted it. 
(3) Right to Appeal: Should a provider or user of an 
interactive computer service wish to challenge the validity of 
the injunctive relief obtained in a proceeding described in 
subsection (f)(1), the provider or user shall have the privilege 
to do so and may exercise that privilege only by filing an 
appropriate motion with the appropriate court within 30 days 
of notice of the order demanding removal of the content. 
This additional subsection, subsection (f), enhances plaintiffs’ 
abilities to enforce a judgment that content is defamatory. It also 
ensures that providers and users of interactive computer services are 
not pressured to overmoderate content online. By providing appellate 
rights to providers and users of interactive computer services under 
(f)(3), it also guarantees that the due process rights of providers and 
users of interactive computer services are protected, and that the 
statute does not operate as an unconstitutional prior restraint. 
1.  Subsection (f)(1) Explained 
Subsection (f)(1) of the proposed amendment encapsulates, in 
large part, the court of appeal’s decision in Hassell. Although the court 
of appeal may have misconstrued the text of section 230 as it is 
currently written, the result of the Hassell supreme court decision, as 
well as cases like Carafano, Batzel, and numerous others show the 
statute creates dangerously broad immunity for malicious persons 
posting content online. An adjustment to the statute, like the one 
suggested here, averts the problematic consequences of the Hassell 
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decision by allowing plaintiffs to obtain orders against providers and 
users of interactive computer services demanding that they take down 
content when a court makes a finding, in an action against a third-party 
information content provider, that the content is defamatory. This rule 
better balances the need for immunity for providers and users of 
interactive computer services with the needs of individual plaintiffs to 
be protected from malicious actors. Moreover, it provides remedies 
for plaintiffs like Batzel and the Hassell without subjecting providers 
and users of interactive computer services to burdensome litigation 
that stems from actions seeking damages. 
Another important component to this subsection is the clause 
requiring notice to the provider or user of interactive computer 
services as to the existence of the action against the third-party 
information content provider. This provision ensures that these 
providers are protected from unexpected orders with which they 
cannot quickly comply. It also works to assail some of the concerns 
raised by the dissenting and concurring justices in Hassell who 
worried that allowing injunctions to run to non-parties might be a 
violation of due process.257 By giving providers and users of 
interactive computer services notice and an opportunity to be heard, 
this subsection protects providers and users of interactive computer 
services from judgments that might unfairly obligate them to remove 
content. It also serves to safeguard judgments from collateral and 
direct attack. 
Subsection (f)(1)(B) protects plaintiffs in cases where bots or 
other users post hundreds or thousands of similar messages—and 
those messages are adjudged defamatory or otherwise illegal—or 
where third-party information content providers continue to post new 
but similar defamatory content despite a judgment against them. Bots 
and other automated posts, by way of their ability to proliferate content 
quickly, pose significant challenges to persons seeking to remove 
illegal defamatory content once it has been released. This provision 
gives victims of defamation broader rights against providers and users 
of interactive computer services and would hopefully give judicial 
 
 257. See Hassell III, 420 P.3d 776, 794 (Cal. 2018) (Kruger, J., concurring) (stating that due 
process bars an injunction from binding a nonparty); id. at 824–25 (Cuéllar, J. dissenting) 
(recommending that the case be remanded to the trial court so that it might determine whether the 
injunction should run to Yelp). 
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findings of defamation increased force in their ability to protect people 
targeted online. 
To protect First Amendment rights, subsection (B) also specifies 
that additional content, posted after a defamation suit, cannot be 
removed unless it is “substantially identical” to content adjudged to be 
defamatory. By including the language “substantially identical,” 
subsection (B) subverts potential criticism under the prior restraint 
doctrine. In Balboa Island Village Inn, Inc. v. Lemen,258 the California 
Supreme Court permitted an injunction against a defendant’s 
defamatory speech that prohibited the defendant from repeating 
additional statements that “were determined at trial to be 
defamatory.”259 By providing that the statements must be 
“substantially identical” to content previously adjudged to be 
defamatory, subsection (B) remains within the purview of relief 
permitted by the Balboa Island Village Inn, Inc. court and thus 
remains constitutionally sound. 
2.  Subsection (f)(2) Explained 
Section (f)(2) bars plaintiffs from enforcing an injunction 
obtained against a provider or user of an interactive computer service 
before first taking reasonable steps to obtain compliance with the 
removal order by an information content provider. By placing a barrier 
between the providers and users of interactive computer services and 
successful plaintiffs, this provision helps ensure that providers and 
users of interactive computer services are not subject to burdensome 
demands—a concern raised by the drafters of section 230.260 
3.  Subsection (f)(3) Explained 
Subsection (f)(3) serves two purposes. First, it provides 
protections, in addition to those included in subsection (f)(1), for the 
due process rights of providers and users of interactive computer 
services that end up subject to injunctions under the statute. Second, it 
protects against the concern, raised in Hassell, that allowing plaintiffs 
to sue posters of content to obtain injunctions against providers or 
users of interactive computer services incentivizes plaintiffs with 
substantial resources to sue content providers who cannot afford to 
 
 258. 156 P.3d 339 (Cal. 2007). 
 259. Id. at 353. 
 260. See supra Part III.A. 
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defend their truthful comments and, because of their lack of resources, 
take default judgments.261 The provision stating that an information 
content provider may “challenge the validity of the injunctive 
relief . . . by filing an appropriate motion with the appropriate court 
within 30 days of notice of the order demanding removal of the 
content”262 operates to ensure that third-party information content 
providers are protected by an additional set of resources, those of the 
provider or user of interactive computer services. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
Much of this Note focused on the argument that California courts 
correctly construed section 230’s protections—an important insight 
for those seeking to enforce and understand the statute as it currently 
exists. However, a sizeable portion also focused on the problems 
posed by this interpretation of the statute—namely that it creates too 
large of an impediment to the rights of people targeted by bad actors 
online. Many of the proposals to correct this problem do not give 
enough deference to the importance of section 230’s protections and 
instead advise repeal of the statute in favor of common-law principles 
or propose a substantial overhaul of the statute. These approaches 
create serious risks to industry and commerce online, which are vital 
economic forces in the twenty-first century. Instead of arguing that we 
should rewrite section 230, this Note advocated for a different 
approach that proposed only slight tweaks to the statute in order to 




 261. This provision would likely produce the specified result by allowing third-party 
information content providers to request that providers or users of an interactive computer services 
defend information content providers’ posts. If a provider or user of an interactive computer service 
agreed to defend the post, the information content provider might then share with the provider or 
user of the interactive computer service evidence relevant to a defense on appeal. The provider or 
user of interactive computer services would then have the right to make an independent 
determination as to whether to involve itself in the litigation and assert its own due process rights 
to protect the content on its website. If a judgment appears problematic, a company like Yelp or 
Twitter would have an incentive to appeal in order to protect the integrity of reviews and other 
valuable content that brings traffic to its platform. 
 262. See supra Part III.E. 
